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INTRODUCTION 
 
The issue of legal jurisdiction is considered an integral part of sovereignty and one in 
which States naturally assume responsibility to adjudicate on matters and persons 
within their territorial boundaries. Except by mutual consent, no State is allowed to 
undermine the sovereign authority of another by enacting and applying its laws to 
matters and persons within the jurisdiction of that other State except in 
circumstances permitted under conflict of law principles. However, global expansion 
of commerce, flourishing of multinational corporations, and technological revolution, 
has not only increased international transaction in securities, but also market 
abuses, fraud and manipulative conduct associated with domestic securities markets 
have spread across borders. So, instead of jurisdiction based on conventional 
principles, a State justify extraterritorial application of its national securities regulation 
if the abusive, fraudulent or manipulative conduct of foreign persons imposes 
negative externalities on the State, its economy, and investors.   
 
United States has applied in other countries, Rule 10b-5 - securities antifraud 
legislation promulgated under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 
US Courts have taken the view that US Congress would have intended the 
legislation to apply extraterritorially although the parameters of subject matter under 
which assertion of jurisdiction is predicated, are not explicitly defined. The Courts 
usually apply two tests - conduct test if the substantial part of the fraudulent conduct 
occurs in the United States even though certain consequences of the conduct have 
had an impact upon United States or foreign investors in other nations, and effect 
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test if the wrongful conduct outside the United States has substantial effect in United 
States or on US citizens.  
 
However, the US Supreme Court’s decision in Morrison v National Australia Bank 
Ltd has declared that Rule 10b-5 applies only to transactions in securities that take 
place in the United States or transactions in securities listed on a US securities 
exchange. The Court takes the view that the antifraud legislation lacks express 
affirmative clarity and that extraterritoriality is not a matter of subject-matter 
jurisdiction but rather a question on the merits. So a new test – transactional test, will 
not allow Rule 10b-5 claims by a US plaintiff purchasing securities abroad of any 
issuer whether domestic or foreign where the securities are not listed in any stock 
exchange in the United States.  
 
This case undoubtedly raises a number of interesting questions particularly in 
relations to its implication on extraterritoriality but more generally on securities 
regulation and international securities market. Much as there is no exhaustive 
answer, the following five chapters help to shed light on the fundamental issues 
critical to the subject matter of extraterritoriality and the application of national 
securities regulation within the context of both public and private international law. 
The conclusion is that the reinstatement of presumption against extraterritoriality is a 
legal milestone but if the Investment Protection and Securities Reform Bill of 2010 
pending at the U.S Congress is eventually signed into law it will bring back the 
regime of uncertainty and unpredictability associated with the conduct and effects 
test.  
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CHAPTER I 
INTERNATIONALISATION OF SECURITIES MARKETS 
 
Internationalisation of securities market is not a geographical expression of physical 
union of participants haggling over investments. It has been shown that the market is 
not location bound and that participants from different jurisdictions interact 
simultaneously on securities issued from different countries and in various 
denominated currencies. It is critical that economic factor, cross-border listing, cross-
border-merger and acquisitions of securities exchanges and electronic system of 
communication have all combined with a number of other variables to create a global 
securities system which has blurred the line of domestic, foreign and international 
securities trading. This chapter is all about setting out the nature of 
internationalisation of securities market and it is far from being exhaustive of all the 
details that are necessary for the understanding of the processes of securities law or 
even the subject matter of internationalisation of securities market. It has, however 
provided the basis for understanding the issues of securities regulation which is the 
focus of chapter two.  
 
1.1 Securities  
According to Withers, ‘stocks and shares are a matter of interest to all, and a 
bewilderment to most, of civilised humanity.’1 The bewilderment arises essentially 
from the fact that securities mean different things in different situations so much so 
that what could be ordinary to a lay man is lost in contextual flexibility. Benjamin 
                                                          
1 Geoffrey Fuller, The Law and Practice of International Capital Market, (LexisNexis Butterworths, 
2007), p.1 
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sees securities as a type of transferable asset2 the original essence of which is that 
‘repayment of debt obligation is secured on the asset of the issuer.’3 When used in 
the context of personal security, securities refer to an undertaken by guarantor to 
bear responsibility for the repayment of debt in the event that the debtor defaults or it 
could be real security in which case a third party makes available property, which 
could be disposed of in order to enforce the discharge of the debtor’s obligation.4 
The recent meaning attributed by Benjamin includes ‘units in investment funds and 
other forms of readily transferable investment.’5  Fuller states that securities can 
mean ‘security interests (such as mortgages and charges), or guarantees’6 but when 
used in the context of securities market, it comes to be known as ‘transferable 
financial investments.’7 Although there may be variations as to the branding of these 
products according to jurisdictions, the common denominator is that the articles of 
trade or products traded in securities market are transferable financial investments.  
 
It follows then that securities market can be characterised as a place for the buying 
and selling of securities ‘between subjects of economy on the basis of demand and 
supply.’8 In other words, it is ‘a system of interconnection between all participants 
(professional and nonprofessional) that provides effective conditions: to buy and sell 
securities.’9 The market ‘attracts new capital by means of issuance of new security 
(securitization of debt)’10 the same way that it ‘transfers real asset into financial 
                                                          
2 Joanna Benjamin, Interests in Securities: A Proprietary Law Analysis of International Securities 
Market, (Oxford University Press, 2000), p.4 
3 Ibid, p.4 
4 Fisher and Lightwood’s Law of Mortgage, Wayne Clarke as coordinating editor (LexisNexis 
Butterworths, 2006), p.1 
5 Joanna Benjamin, no.2 , p.4 
6 Geoffrey Fuller, no.1, p.5 
7 Ibid, p.5 
8 Wikipedia available at http://en.wikipedia.org accessed 30 June 2011 
9 Ibid 
10 Ibid 
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asset’11 as well as ‘invests money for short or long term periods with the aim of 
deriving profit.’12 
 
1.2 Securities Market 
The idea of securities market, according to Adam, does not give rise to a physical 
location which brings participants into physical contact to trade in securities but 
rather refers to ‘a vast amount of capital available from financial institutions, pension 
funds, and investment funds (and a few high-net worth individuals) which want to buy 
securities, either to hold as an investment or to trade.’13 This is so much that 
‘references to the ‘market’ are more accurately references to the borrowing 
requirements of potential issuers, and the funds available from investors’,14 the size 
of the market being determined by funds availability and the tradability of the 
securities issued.15  
 
The securities are of medium and long term nature, constituting one type of 
securities market known as capital market which this work is concerned with, the 
other type being money market dealing with deposits and short term instrument.16 
When capital market is domestic, it means that it is located in one country and the 
securities issued are ‘issued to only the investors in that country, by issuers resident 
in that country, and denominated in the currency of that country.’17 Foreign market is 
everything as domestic market except that issuers of securities reside in country 
                                                          
11 Wikipedia, no.8 
12 Ibid 
13 David Adams, Banking and Capital Markets, (College of Law Publishing, 2008), p.207 
14 Ibid, p.207 
15 Ibid, p.207 
16 Geoffrey Fuller, no.1, p.1 
17 Ibid,  p.1 
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other than that where they are issued.18 In international capital market, ‘securities are 
issued to and traded by investors in different countries simultaneously, and can be in 
any major currency.’19 Whatever the type, two types of securities traded are equity 
securities and debt securities although there exists some kind of hybrid between 
them.  
 
In equity security a company is the only issuer and the security issued is share. 
Reference to shares in equity security is that of ordinary shares as opposed to 
preferred or proposed rights and that gives the idea of residual rights after discharge 
of prior commitments.20 Equity securities are known to be non-returnable investment, 
the implication of which is that an investor wishing to realise his investment capital 
either sells the shares or winds up the company,21 and because of this, an investor is 
not entitled to dividend for the reason that he lacks absolute right to receive a return 
on its investment.22  
 
Conversely, the issuer in debt security may be company or anyone else,23 who is 
bound in a contract with the investor or holder such that the holder is the creditor of 
the issuer who can lay claim to principal and interest as well as other entitlements 
when they become due.24 But the holder of debt security is not a member of the 
company or the issuer and so does not take any equity in the issuer or assert any 
rights over the issuer.25 They are either bonds or notes and Fuller maintains that 
                                                          
18 Ibid, p.1 
19 Geoffrey Fuller, no.19, p.1 
20 Ibid, p.9 
21 David Adams, no.13, p.211 
22 Ibid, p.211 
23 Geoffrey Fuller, no.1, p.8 
24 Ibid, p.9 
25 Ibid, p.9 
DISSERTATION S3012 
 
9 
 
‘legally, there is no distinction between the two terms both of which mean, 
essentially, an instrument containing or evidencing a debt obligation on the part of 
the issuer.’26 If the maturity of debt securities is more than one year, it is known as 
‘Eurobonds’ when issued under a medium term note programme, it is called ‘Medium 
term note’, while one with less than a year maturity is referred to as ‘Euro-
commercial paper’.’27 The investor can decide to hold the security until it matures 
and that means he has to be confined to the primary market. But sometimes, 
investors do have the need to sell their securities before it matures in order to realise 
their capital much earlier than maturity date.28 Adams describes this early disposal of 
securities as secondary market, a place in which investors and traders can buy and 
sell securities that have already been issued.29 In order to issue securities for sale, 
the conventional approach is for issuers to list the securities on a stock exchange 
although they can be traded privately or even electronically. Stock market is a non-
physical public entity where securities are traded but the intermediaries between the 
issuers and investors operate in a stock exchange.30 Therefore, the mechanism of 
the internationalisation of securities market is such as would involve the issuer, 
investor, and stock market as major influences in the market processes.   
 
Internationalisation of securities market is the idea that securities are issued to and 
traded by investors in different countries simultaneously and in an as many major 
currencies as possible.31 A number of factors influence the system of 
internationalization including economic factor, cross-border listing, mergers and 
                                                          
26 Geoffrey Fuller, no.1, p.19 
27 ‘Access to the International Capitals by Latin American Companies’, Part 1, Mayer, Brown and 
Platt, 14 November 2000 
28 David Adams, no.13, p.220 
29 Ibid, p.220 
30 Wikipedia available at www.wikipedia.com accessed 4 July 2011 
31 Geoffrey Fuller, no.1, p.2 
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acquisitions of securities exchanges, as well as technological development. The 
economic factor is the idea that ‘world class’ companies are becoming de-
nationalised in their share-holders, and that traders on any world market may 
comprise many nationalities’32 and so ‘equity markets have become more 
international in complexion.’33 It is traditional for issuers to have their home 
jurisdiction as primary listing of choice, but the trend over the years has been for 
issuers to in addition to listing in their domestic market choose to cross-list in a 
foreign market. Similarly, cross-border merger of security exchanges has resulted in 
increased number of international investors and made stock markets competitive.34 It 
was announced on 9 February 2011 that TMX Group Inc., the operator of the 
Toronto Stock Exchange and the Toronto Venture Exchange, and the London Stock 
Exchange Group plc agreed a ‘£4.3 billion all-share merger of equals to combine 
Europe’s and Canada’s diversified exchange groups.’35 When fully materialised, the 
merger was estimated to create ‘the world number one listings venue by number of 
total listings (over 6,700 companies with an aggregate market capitalisation of 
approximately £3.7 trillion).’36 It is also reckoned that New York Stock Exchange 
(‘NYSE’) acquired Euronext, which operates exchanges in Paris, Amsterdam, 
Brussels, and Lisbon.37 NYSE Euronext has merged with Germany’s Deutche Borse 
in a deal that is said to create the world’s biggest exchange with a combined revenue 
of £3.5bn. There is a wide acknowledgement that development in technology has 
been one of the principle factors that has brought about the internationalisation of 
                                                          
32 Mark Vodicka, International Securities Trading (Legal Books, 1992), p.1 
33 Ibid, p.1 
34 Ioannis Kokkoris and Rodrigo Olavares-Caminal, ‘Some Issues on Cross-Border Stock Exchange 
Merger’, University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law, Vol.29.2, 2007-2008, p.456  
35 Jonathan Deverill, ‘Proposed Merger Of TSX And LSE To Create World's No.1 Listings Venue For 
Natural Resources And Clean Technology Companies’, DMH Stallard, 11 February, 2011, available at 
http://www.mondaq.com accessed 10 July 2011 
36 Ibid 
37 Ibid 
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securities market. One of the ways it has revolutionarised securities industry is the 
introduction of online brokerage accounts, which gives ordinary retail investors 
‘access to the kind of financial research that once was available only to institutions 
and very wealthy individuals.’38     
 
Summarily, the internalisation of securities market is consistent with the trend of 
globalisation in which fortunes of global participants have become bound together as 
nations become more than ever interdependent.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
38 Nancy C. Libin and James S. Wrona, ‘The Securities Industry and the Internet: A Suitable Match?, 
Columbia Business Law Review, Vol. 2001, p.601 
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CHAPTER II 
REGULATION OF SECURITIES MARKETS AND INSTITUTIONS 
 
This chapter examines the concept of regulation from the point of view that it is a 
matter of public law the purpose of which is to intervene in circumstances in which 
public interest is at stake. Against this background, it sets out securities regulation in 
a manner that enhances the understanding of rules governing the conduct of 
business of securities, but it also examines the context of the United States 
securities regulation and how that prompted the regime of eight statutes that govern 
different aspects of securities business.  
 
2.1 The Concept of Regulation 
The rationalisation of regulation goes into the heart of the familiar tension between 
the perceived sovereign powers of the state and free market economy. Proponents 
of the later take the view that instead of getting caught up with the interference of the 
state, the forces determining prices and quantities – supply and demand in the 
markets should be harnessed to bring about the needed order and conduct in the 
system. The proponents of the former believe that the state is and should be at the 
centre and not market, and therefore it should utilize its sovereign assets to control 
the behaviour and activities in the market. The premise is that the market lacks the 
capacity to control itself and that without the intervention of the state the net result 
would be not just chaos but potentially the collapse of the entire system.39  
 
                                                          
39 George Friedman, ‘States, Economics and Markets: Redefining the Rules’, Stratfor Global 
Intelligence, October 13 2008 available at www.stratfor.com accessed 13 July 2011 
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When Selznick describes regulation as ‘a sustained and focused control exercised 
by a public agency over activities that are valued by a community’40, Ogus believes 
that he seeks to emphasize that ‘“valued activities” serve to exclude from the 
concept of regulation the traditional areas of criminal law and the concerns of the 
criminal justice system.’41  Ogus thinks of the need to narrow the subject even further 
in terms that recognises regulation from a fundamentally politico-economic concept 
standpoint the best understanding of which is with reference to different systems of 
economic organisation.42 The market system is one that he believes to leave 
individuals and groups free,43 ‘subject only to certain basic restraints, to pursue their 
own welfare goals’44 through the instrumentality of private law and without any 
significant role of regulation or public law.45 The private nature of the agreements in 
this system underlines the fact that ‘it is left to individuals and not the state to enforce 
rights; and obligations are incurred voluntarily in the sense that they can always be 
displaced by agreements between the affected parties, if they are found to be 
inappropriate.’46 This is remarkably different from the other system that Ogus refers 
to as collectivist system, one which requires the intervention of the state ‘to correct 
perceived deficiencies in the market system in meeting collective or public interest 
goals.’47      
 
Prosser identifies two dimensions of the regulatory power of the state. The first 
according to him is ‘concerned with goods and services provided by the institutions 
                                                          
40 P. Scheznick, ‘Focusing Organisational Research on Regulation’ in R. Noll (ed.), Regulatory Policy 
and the Social Sciences, (American Enterprise Institute for public policy research, 1983), p.363 
41 Anthony I. Ogus, Regulation: Legal Form and Economic Theory, (Hart Publishing, 2004), p.1 
42 Ibid, p.1 
43 Ibid, p.1 
44 Ibid, p.1 
45 Ibid, p.1 
46 Ibid, p.2 
47 Ibid, p.2 
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between the market and the state, which may include enterprises at arm’s length 
from government.’48 The second is his normative idea that is based on ‘egalitarian 
rights derived from citizenship rather than an ability to bid in the marketplace.’49 
Ogus thinks in terms of three characteristics. The first is the idea of control by a 
superior, which is based on directive function in which individuals are compelled to50 
‘behave in particular ways with the threat of sanctions if they do not comply.’51 The 
second is the idea of public law from the point of view that the state enforces52 ‘the 
obligations which cannot be overreached by private agreement between the parties 
concerned.’53 The third is the idea of centralization arising from the fact that the role 
of the state in the whole formulation is so fundamental.54  He considers the need to 
approach regulatory questions from the point of view of social regulation and 
economic regulation. Social regulation is seen by him to concentrate on two types of 
market failure. In the first category, because ‘individuals in an existing, or potential, 
contractual relationship with firms supplying goods or services often have inadequate 
information concerning the quality offered by suppliers, the unrestricted market may 
fail to meet their preferences.’55 The second category is that even if there is no gap 
in information, ‘market transactions may have spill over effects (or externalities) 
which adversely affect individuals who are not involved in transactions.’56 In the face 
of these two problems, it is for the policy-makers to determine appropriate regulatory 
instruments in accordance with the degree of the required state intervention.57  
                                                          
48 Tony Prosser, ‘Public Service Law: Privatisation’s Unexpected Offering’, in Colin Scott, Regulation, 
(Dartmouth/Ashgate Publishing Company, 2003), p.65 
49 Ibid, p.65 
50 Anthony I. Ogus, no.41, p.2 
51 Ibid, p.2 
52 Ibid, p.2 
53 Ibid, p.2 
54 Ibid, p.2 
55 Ibid, p.4 
56 Ibid, p.4 
57 Ibid, p.6 
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Economic regulation is prefaced on the need to provide ‘a substitute for competition 
in relation to natural monopolies’58 from three broad perspectives, the first 
perspective bearing upon the expectation that ‘the mechanics of political direction 
and accountability will be sufficient to meet public interest goals’59 given that the firm 
is publicly owned. If the firm is private, the second perspective is to subject it to 
‘external constraints in the form of price and quality regulation.’60 In the third 
perspective, ‘firms desiring to obtain a monopoly right may be forced to compete for 
it’61 on the basis of which ‘they are required to stipulate proposed conditions of 
supply, relating especially to prices and quality; and those conditions then becoming 
terms of the license or franchise under which they exercise their monopoly right.’62       
 
2.1 Securities Regulation 
Securities regulation sits well within the social regulation context of regulation, the 
hallmark of which is to enable policy-makers choose appropriate regulatory 
instruments in order to address two types of market failures. The weaknesses in the 
quality of information will have negative impact in the preferences for goods and 
services; and even without these weaknesses it is still possible that activities in the 
market are capable of imposing negative externalities on individuals who are not 
directly involved in transactions. The corollary is that securities regulation seeks to 
ensure that quality of activities associated with securities transaction including the 
information it generates is of high standard in a way that helps to eliminate or reduce 
at barest minimum the propensity of any externalities within and outside the 
                                                          
58 Anthony I. Ogus, no.41,  p.5 
59 Ibid, p.5 
60 Ibid, p.5 
61 Ibid, p.6 
62 Ibid, p.6 
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securities market. In other words, securities are regulated in order that there is 
proper conduct of securities business so that it does not have negative 
consequences on the whole economy or stability of the financial system.  
 
So, securities regulation is prefaced on three closely-related and overlapping 
objectives including protection of investors; ensuring that markets are fair, efficient 
and transparent; and the reduction of systemic risk.63 Protection of investors is the 
idea that ‘investors should be protected from misleading, manipulative or fraudulent 
practices, including insider trading, front running or trading ahead of customers and 
the misuse of client assets.’64 However, there is an issue that interests in the 
securities market are varied and conflicting and so Johnston and Rockwell suggest 
that regulation needs to take on board the interest of all the actors in the market 
including investors, potential investors, the issuer, creditors, employees, investment 
dealers and advisers, financial institutions, governments, regulators, and even the 
non-investing public.65 To ensure that market is fair, efficient and transparent, 
regulation should ensure that investors are given unfettered access to market 
facilities and price information while relevant information should be widely and timely 
disseminated including pre-trade and post-trade information.66 Reduction of systemic 
risk means that regulation should create disincentive for failure through capital and 
internal control requirements.67 It is remarkable that public interest and protection of 
investors are very dominant features in the formulation and operation of securities 
regulation. Jennings and Marsh take the view that ‘the securities market vast 
                                                          
63 International Organisation of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), ‘Objectives and Principles of 
Securities Regulation’, May 2003, p.5 
64 Ibid, p.5 
65 David Johnston and Kathleen Doyle Rockwell, Canadian Securities Regulation, (LexisNexis 
Butterworths, 2006), p.3 
66 IOSCO, no.63, p.6 
67 Ibid, p.6 
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resources for marshalling the capital of industrial and institutional investors give 
corporate enterprise access to large sources of funds that would not otherwise be 
available.’68 Therefore, the need for regulation is clearly derived from the very nature 
of securities market.69  
 
2.3 The United States Securities Regulation 
The market crash of 1929 and the great depression that followed provided the 
setting for the legislative regimes associated with regulation of the United States 
securities market. James notes that the period from 1900 to 1929 transformed the 
investment picture in the United States with the percentage of tangible wealth in the 
form of securities rising from 23 percent to over 75 percent between 1908 and 1929, 
and the total aggregation of new issues in dollar to thirty-seven billion dollars 
between 1922 and 1929 while stockholders had a record increase from four million 
four hundred thousand to over eighteen million between 1900 and 1928.70 He 
reckons that following the market crash of 1929 and the continued depression 
thereafter, the bonds which had a market value of $47,000,000,000 in January 1931 
shrunk to $31,000,000,000 by April 1933, while stocks with a market value of 
$87,000,000,000 in September 1929 was a value less than $16,000,000,000 in July 
1932.71 Consequently, there was massive decrease in income, land values 
plummeted, production nose-dived, while public mood was that of despair and 
anger.72  
 
                                                          
68 Richard W. Jennings and Harold Marsh Jr, Securities Regulation: Cases and Materials, 
(Foundation Press, 1987), p.2 
69 David Johnston and Kathleen Doyle Rockwell, no.65  p.1 
70 Laylin K. James, ‘Securities Act of 1933’, Michigan Law Review, Vol.32, 1933-1934, p.628 
71 . Ibid,  p.629 
72 Ibid, p.629 
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The legislative response was so massive that there are currently eight statutes 
regulating the securities market in the United States including the Securities Act of 
1933, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the Public Utility Holding Company Act 
of 1935, the Trust Indenture Act of 1939, the Investment Company Act of 1940, the 
Investment Advisers Act of 1940, and to some extent the Securities Investor 
Protection Act of 1970, and then the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.73    
 
The Securities Act of 1933 marked the turning point in the United States securities 
regulation. Concerned with the initial distribution of securities rather than their 
subsequent trading,74 the Act is aimed at achieving two things the first of which made 
mandatory filing with the Federal Trade Commission full, accurate, and complete 
statements of all pertinent facts concerning issues of the securities.75 The second is 
that ‘instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce and the 
mails shall not be used directly and indirectly to effectuate fraudulent sales.’76 The 
securities that the Act applies to cover just about everything but following criticism 
about limited exemption or none at all, the National Securities Markets Improvement 
Act of 1996 was enacted to allow the Securities and Exchange Commission to 
conditionally or unconditionally exempt any person, security, or transaction, or any 
class or classes of persons from any provision of the Securities Act.77 The inevitable 
consequence of the pre-1996 Act was the fear of reduction in new financing in the 
U.S. and the likelihood that the requirement for information to be filed in foreign 
                                                          
73 Louise Loss and Joel Seligman, Fundamentals of Securities Regulation, (ASPEN, 2004), p.45 
74 Ibid, p.45 
75 Laylin K. James, no.70, p.630 
76 Ibid, p.630 
77 Louise Loss and Joel Seligman, no.73, p.45 
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government issues might lead such issuers to look for alternative market for 
financing.78 
 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, unlike the 1933 Act, is directed at post distribution 
trading and issuers have continuing obligation to disclose through the registration of 
all securities traded on exchanges and filing of periodic reports.79 With effect from 
1964, these provisions became applicable to certain securities traded in the over-
the-counter market and in 1968 “tender offers” were added to the list.80 Loss and 
Seligman note that clearly, the Act was framed along three themes including the 
‘regulation of the exchange and over-the-counter market; prevention of fraud and 
market manipulation; as well as control of securities credit by the Board of Governors 
of the Federal Reserve System as part of its authority over the nation’s credit 
generally.’81  
 
The Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 ‘regulates electric and gas holding 
companies and their subsidiaries’, while the 1933 Act is supplemented by the Trust 
Indenture Act of 1939 when distribution consists of debt securities.82 The Investment 
Company Act of 1940 is directed at companies the primary business of which is 
investing and reinvesting in securities of other companies while under the Investment 
Advisers Act of 1940, persons engaged for compensation in the business of 
rendering advice or issuing analyses or reports concerning securities are required to 
register with the Securities and Exchange Commission.83  The Securities Investor 
                                                          
78 Laylin K. James, no.70, p.635 
79 Loise Loss and Joel Seligman, no.73, p.46 
80 Ibid, p.46 
81 Ibid, p.47 
82 Ibid, p.47 
83 Ibid, p.47 
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Protection Act of 1940 ‘insures customers against their broker’s insolvency up to 
$500,000 for each account, except that the maximum is $100,000 to the extent that a 
claim is for cash rather than securities.’84 The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 makes 
SEC party on any issue in a case under Chapter 11 although it has no right of appeal 
on any judgment order or decree entered in the case.85 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 
2002 otherwise known as the Public Accounting Reform and Investment Protection 
Act, includes 11 titles title1 of which established the Public Company Accounting 
Oversight Board (PCAOB), which is a private organisation with power to ‘register, set 
audit standards for, inspect, conduct investigation and disciplinary proceedings for 
public accounting firms that provide audit reports for issuers whose securities were 
registered under section 12 of the 1934 Act, that file reports under section 15d of the 
1934 Act, or that have filed a registration statement under the Securities Act of 
1933.’86 
 
In summary, this chapter addresses specific characters that form the basis upon 
which regulation is formulated. The major goal of securities market regulation is to 
bring about orderliness and this is achieved by establishing fair market practices and 
minimum capital requirements in order to minimize the risk of insolvency. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
NATIONAL REGULATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL MARKETS: 
EXTRATERRITORIAL ISSUES 
 
 
3.1 Nature of National Securities Regulation 
National securities regulation is the idea that regulation is directed at governing the 
conduct of securities transaction within a territorial boundary or jurisdiction. The 
United Kingdom securities regulation governs the United Kingdom securities market 
the same way that the United States securities regulation governs the United States 
securities market, and the same goes for just about every other country around the 
world. Coffee and Sale suggest that the world of securities market was once settled 
and stable such that securities exchanges were protected by national boundaries 
from international competition.87 The underlying assumption is that the public interest 
objective being served by these regulations is directed at the activities and 
participants domiciled in individual jurisdictions so that public law nature of the 
regulations is understood in terms of protecting investors in a country, ensuring that 
securities market of that country is fair, efficient and transparent, as well as reduction 
of systemic risk in the securities market of that country. However, the nature of public 
law is such that regulation is formulated on the basis of private interest the ultimate 
objective of which is to preserve economic liberty, the freedom to invest in the 
securities market without the individual being unduly deprived of their resources.88 
On the other hand, private law only plays a facilitative role in terms that ‘gives 
security to the processes required for those resources to shift to their most valuable 
uses.’89 But individual autonomy as an ingredient of private law presupposes that 
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participants in the securities market do not relate with one another on the basis of 
coercion, they do so by mutual will and consent through the operation of law of 
contract, the enforcement of which is at the instance of the parties without any 
involvement of the state unlike the enforcement of national securities regulation 
which is done through the legal system of the jurisdiction overseeing the market. As 
long as the offenders are domiciled within the jurisdiction of the forum country no 
issue arises as to extraterritorial application. However, with the internalisation of 
securities market, it is inevitable for different legal and regulatory rules to apply. The 
question that arises is how a participant in one jurisdiction who contravenes anti-
fraud regulation of another jurisdiction could be brought to account in that other 
jurisdiction. The course of action in the circumstances of that case is to subject the 
offender to the legal system of the country whose regulation they have offended, and 
doing that will give rise to extraterritorial application of national securities regulation 
of that country.  
 
There are problems associated with both public and private law enforcements but 
Bagheri suggests that parties to a contract do make advance choice of law to govern 
their contractual obligations as a way of avoiding future dispute and for purposes of 
certainty and predictability although he warns that some externalities may arise from 
the contract capable of undermining its enforcement.90 He notes that the problem is 
much more complex when it comes to regulated international markets, where private 
parties are unable to allocate associated risks.91 In such situations he maintains that 
there is likelihood of conflict of interest as a result of lack of institutional co-operation 
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in harmonising national economic regulations.92 But the difficulty with application of 
national securities regulation extraterritorially is associated with what Bagheri refers 
to as jurisdictional conflicts in international economic law which replicates 
considerable tension between national and international legal orders.93 Haseltine 
observes that any attempt to ‘enforce one country’s laws or rules in the face of 
another country’s different system of regulation, or to adapt many countries’ 
regulatory pattern to that of another’94 must take into consideration the fact that there 
are differences in culture which make such effort extremely difficult.95 He also notes 
that social and economic factors in developed markets may militate against such 
move the same way that implementation of central system of regulation in 
developing markets will be counterproductive.96 The only way around the problem 
according to him is negotiation and compromise among countries so that all interests 
will be taken on board.97 Part of that doubt has been prefaced on the inadequacies of 
public international law to deal with multidimensional problems associated with the 
contemporary international economic relations.98 There is for instance a disparity 
between the United States system of regulation which is considered comprehensive 
and pervasive and that obtainable in other countries which is relatively less robust.99 
It is therefore more beneficial to pursue policy of compromise and negotiation100 
rather than unilateral application of one country’s system of regulation to ‘those who 
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may or may not have the need or desire for such extensive regulations in their own 
country.’101 
 
3.2 Extraterritoriality 
In private international law, the determination of a civil case involving more than one 
country starts with the question of which country’s courts have jurisdiction to try the 
case and once that is settled it is followed by the next question of which country’s 
substantive law is applicable to the case. The principles of conflict of law rules 
become the operational instrument by which determination is based because choice 
has to be made about which law should govern a transaction or relationships 
between parties in terms of enforcement, perfection of interest, and priority of 
interests.102  In public international law, cases involving elements in which more than 
one state is affected do proceed from the determination of the same questions as to 
whether the courts of states concerned have jurisdiction to try the case, and if so 
which state’s substantive law can apply.103 Although the same two sets of questions 
may arise in both private international and public international law contexts, the 
same answers do not give rise to the same result.104 This is because it is a well 
established principle of public international law that the courts of one state will not 
enforce the public law of other states.105 Once a court reaches a conclusion that its 
state public law is not applicable to a case before it, it is bound to decline jurisdiction 
over that case, and this gives rise to the idea that the choice of public law is 
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conclusive as to jurisdiction.106 Meessen suggests that ‘modern customary 
international legal limitations on a nation’s exercise of extraterritorial authority have 
their roots in those fundamental principles of territorial sovereignty that still inform 
much of modern international law.’107 However, he maintains that the current 
technological and intellectual revolution taking place around the world not only 
encourage international economic and social intercourse108 but also support the 
proposition that ‘the effect of governmental encroachments upon human liberty often 
transcend territorial boundaries, thus creating community interest in limiting or 
preventing such entanglements.’109  
 
But this is not saying that the idea of territorial sovereignty has been extinguished, 
but only a recognition that in situation in which a broad interest is to be served or 
relatively apparent in specific cross border transactions it becomes necessary for a 
state to be allowed to address under its laws activities that are carried out beyond its 
territorial borders.110 This idea has been rationalised by the Permanent Court of 
International Justice in the famous Lotus case – France v Turkey.111 A French 
steamship – S.S. Lotus collided with a Turkish Steamer – S.S. Boz-Kourt in a region 
just north of Mytilene on 2 August 1926 as a result of which eight Turkish nationals 
died. Turkey arrested Monsieur Demons, the French officer on duty at the time of 
collision and sought to try him for manslaughter under Turkish criminal law of 
negligence. At issue was whether Turkey could assert jurisdiction to try Demons 
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since the collision occurred on the high seas. France objected to the Turkish 
jurisdiction on the ground that only the state whose flag the vessel flew had exclusive 
jurisdiction over the matter. The Court went ahead to rule in favour of Turkey stating 
that even though all Demons acts were carried out in French territory Turkish law 
could govern. Similar decision was made in US v Aluminium Co. of America where 
U.S. Court declared that: ‘any state may impose liabilities, even upon persons not 
within its allegiance, for conduct outside its borders that has consequences within its 
borders which the state reprehends.’112 The principle in both cases is understood to 
mean that states may act in any way they like so long as it does not contravene an 
explicit prohibition but Meessen takes the view that ‘the absence of such general 
prohibition does not, of course, mean that nation states are free to interfere with 
each other’s internal affairs whenever harmful effects might justify such 
interference.’113 He thinks rather of situations of co-operation among states 
connected with a particular case in ways that enable them accommodate their 
conflicting interest in good faith when each has legitimate cause to assert 
jurisdiction.114   
 
3.3 The Doctrine of Conduct and Effects 
The principle of subject matter jurisdiction upon which extraterritoriality is rationalised 
is pursued along the theory of conduct and theory of effect. The subject matter action 
pursued under the conduct theory arises if conduct within the borders of one state 
has had an impact within that state and or in the case of securities market on 
investors in other states. The objective of this theory is to ensure that the state is not 
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being used as a launching pad for fraudulent activities. Lange and Born observe 
three ways in which antifraud provision of the United States is applied 
extraterritorially on the basis of this theory. The first is about ‘sales to Americans 
resident outside the United States only if the conduct within the United States 
materially contributes to any lose.’115 The second is concerned with ‘sales to non-
Americans outside the United States only if the conduct within the United States 
directly causes the alleged losses.’116 The third concerns ‘sales to Americans 
resident in the United States whether or not there is significant conduct within the 
United States.’117 The United States Second Circuit Court engaged conduct test in its 
extraterritorial application of U.S. securities law in Leasco Data Processing 
Equipment Corp v Maxwell.118 The defendant was a British company whose shares 
were fraudulently sold in England to the publicly owned American company. Judge 
Friendly asserted jurisdiction over the case on the basis that a significant part of the 
fraudulent scheme occurred in the United States including planning, meetings, and 
“substantial misrepresentations”.119 But in Bersch v Drexel Firestone Inc63120 the 
Court found subject matter jurisdiction for the American victims resident abroad on 
the basis of conduct in the United States which it considered merely preparatory 
such as drafting of documents but which nonetheless was of material importance to 
the fraud. The Court found jurisdiction for foreign victims based on the fact that the 
actual fraud or acts that directly caused the alleged losses must have taken place 
within the United States. The implication of these two authorities is that the type and 
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significance of conduct that takes place in the United States as well as the nationality 
of the victims form important consideration when U.S courts determine subject 
matter jurisdiction under conduct theory.121 
 
The effect theory bears upon a different paradigm focusing not on conduct but rather 
on its impact. According to Lange and Born, ‘the antifraud rules of the United States 
securities laws are applied to foreign conduct that has a ‘significant impact’ on U.S. 
securities markets, even if U.S. investors are not specifically harmed.’122 In 
Schoenbaum v Firstbrook,123 the plaintiffs alleged that the directors of a Canadian 
Corporation authorized the sale of the Canadian company’s stock in Canada, at an 
unfairly low price, which had adverse effect on the value of the company’s securities 
listed on the American Stock Exchange. Even though all of the alleged fraud took 
place abroad, the Second Circuit found jurisdiction because the fraud had sufficiently 
serious effect upon the United States commerce as it diluted the equity interest of 
the American shareholders.124 In IIT v Vencap Ltd,125 the Second Circuit did not think 
that U.S. securities laws should be applied extraterritorially because of insufficient 
effect in the sense of negligible number of Americans defrauded when compared 
with their foreign counterparts, and coupled with the fact that the foreign company’ 
securities were not listed on an American stock exchange.126  
 
U.S. court rationalised their conduct and effects jurisdiction based on the proposition 
that Congress would have intended extraterritorial application to American investors 
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but critics have argued that intention of congress falls short of clarity as to provide a 
firm basis for broad interpretation justifying extraterritoriality. Thomas takes the view 
that ‘the conduct and effects tests are too simple and mechanistic to adequately 
express the important considerations of policy that should precede assertion of 
jurisdiction over international transactions.’127 Lange and Born argue that disputes 
that have arisen as a result of extraterritoriality are indicative of the fact that ‘the 
expansive effects doctrine makes it difficult to predict when relatively stringent U.S. 
antifraud rules will apply to non-U.S. conduct.’128  
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CHAPTER IV 
 
THE SPECIAL CASE OF THE UNITED STATES SECURITIES FRAUD 
 
 
Rule 10b-5 promulgated under Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act represents a 
ground norm of the United States antifraud legislative effort in securities regulation. It 
is designed to strengthen antifraud regime in security regulation in relations to sales 
or purchase of any type of security so long as it is capable of being traded in security 
market or anything in connection or associated with selling and buying of security. It 
consists of three disjunctive elements including (1) material misstatement of facts 
including withholding of information or giving of misleading information; (2) scheme 
or conduct intended to defraud; and (3) anything else that may directly or indirectly 
cause fraud. Rule 10b-5 does not accept reliance as a basis of liability, which is a 
departure from a common law tort of negligence requiring the claimant to show a 
proof of having relied on the alleged misstatement. A make-up for that under the rule 
is a rebuttable presumption that fraud in securities market affects security prices so 
that an upward or downward movement of price does affect collective transactions in 
the market. Therefore, it is for the defendant to prove that the claimant did not rely in 
the alleged misleading information or that economic loss would have occurred with 
or without any reliance on the information.  
 
4.1 Misstatement and Omission 
A plaintiff in action based on misstatement and omission is required to prove that 
there is material misrepresentation or material failure to disclose. The action in Santa 
Fe Industries Inc. V Green129 did not succeed because the U.S. Supreme court 
concurred with the District Court and Court of Appeals that there was no 
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misstatement or omission in the information statement the minority shareholders 
were provided with. There was unwillingness on the part of the court to extend the 
scope of the statute when its history reflects no more expansive intent and it indeed 
noted that ‘the language of Section 10(b) gives no indication that Congress meant to 
prohibit any conduct not involving manipulation or deceit.’130 Wharf (Holdings) 
Limited v United International Holdings Inc.131 is a confirmation that misstatement 
and omission can be written or oral. In that case, the Supreme Court held that ‘the 
deception element can be satisfied when a promisor secretly intends not to honour a 
promise at the time of making the promise.’132 In Rule 10b-5, SEC is thought by Loss 
and Seligman to believe that the obligation in this provision is a continuing obligation 
so that an issuer must correct statements made if either that subsequent events 
have rendered them inaccurate or the statements were later discovered to have 
been false and misleading from the outset and the issuer has actual or constructive 
knowledge that there is a continued reliance by persons on all or any material portion 
of them.133 Re Time Warner Inc. Securities Litigation134 and Re Burlington Coat 
Factory Securities Litigation135 both support the continuing duty to correct but in 
Ross v A.H. Robins Co. Inc.,136 the District Court explained that ‘Section 10(b) and 
Rule 10b-5 are silent as to the effect of time on the duty to correct’ and ‘no general 
rule of time can be applied to all circumstances.’137 However, the Court took the view 
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that ‘a particular duty to correct a specific prior statement exists as long as traders in 
the market continue to rely on the statement.’138 
 
4.2 Insider Trading 
Insider trading is ‘the practice of an insider, or related party, trading on material non-
public information obtained during the performance of the insider’s duties at the 
corporation, or otherwise misappropriated.’139 It is an area that has drawn much of 
the United States antifraud jurisprudence in securities trading. Loss and Seligman 
suggest that insider trading involves a duty to disclose or abstain and a plaintiff must 
show that there is ‘purchasing or selling of a security after material information is 
received.’140 The court is here invited to decide whether a reasonable investor would 
have considered the news of the offer made as been important such as to lead him 
decide whether and at what price to buy the security offered. Secondly, the material 
information must be non-public.141 In other words, it must be proved to the court that 
the material information was of a confidential nature or at least not divulged to the 
public when it was made. Thirdly, it must be proved that the material non-public 
information was ‘obtained or used in breach of fiduciary or similar duty.’142 All that is 
needed to show here is that the defendant is a corporate insider (directors, officers, 
employees or controlling shareholders) or constructive insider - those who by virtue 
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of professional relationship can give access to non-public information (lawyers, 
banker, accountants or consultants).143  
 
While it may be easy to establish the first and second elements, it is a bit tricky to 
make out the third element based on the fact that the duty to disclose or abstain 
appears to be less than straight forward. The interpretation of that duty was much of 
an issue in SEC v Mark Cuban144 where the Federal District Court appears to 
suggest that it does not amount to a violation of securities laws to trade on non-
public information if the insider agrees to keep it secret and not use it for his own 
benefit.145 Mark Cuban is alleged to have avoided $750,000 in losses by selling off 
his stakes in mama.com after he learnt that new shares were to be issued.146 The 
Federal District Court found for him but the Court of Appeals reinstated the case 
although it did not reverse the proposition of the lower court. The appellate court 
suggested that Mr. Cuban understood the situation to mean that ‘he was allowed to 
trade on the information but prohibited from telling others – in effect providing him an 
exclusive license on material non-public information.’147 The court was undecided 
based on limited record of facts but was clear that both sides understood there was 
to be no trading before the offer was made public.148 Mark Cuban intends to appeal 
to the Supreme Court and if he succeeds, the impact is likely to have wide 
ramifications and if the case can be characterised as a classical theory case, which it 
appears to be, then there is a realistic prospect of success if the Supreme Court’s 
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proposition in Chiarella v United States149 is anything to go by. The question in that 
case is whether ‘a person who learns from the confidential documents of one 
corporation that it is planning an attempt to secure control of a second corporation 
violates Section 10(b) if he fails to disclose the impending takeover before trading in 
the target company’s securities.’150 The Court of Appeals upheld the trial judge’s 
view that ‘”a scheme to defraud” amounted to a plan to obtain money by trick or 
deceit and that ‘a failure by Chiarella to disclose material non-public information with 
the purchase of stock would constitute deceit.’151 The Supreme Court quashed the 
conviction on the ground that there could be no fraud without a duty to speak as that 
duty under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 does not arise from the mere possession of 
non-public market information. However in United States v O’Hagan,152 the Supreme 
Court observed that Chiarella left open misappropriation theory. One of the two 
questions considered in O’Hagan is whether ‘a person who trades in securities for 
personal profit, using confidential information misappropriated in breach of a 
fiduciary duty to the sources of the information, guilty of violating Section 10(b) and 
Rule 10b-5.’153 The trial court said yes. The Court of Appeals said no. The Supreme 
Court said yes, stating that ‘the misappropriation at issue in this case was properly 
made the subject of Section 10(b) charge because it meets the statutory requirement 
that there must be “deceptive” conduct “in connection with“ securities 
transactions.’59 If Mark Cuban’s case is appropriation theory compliant, there is a 
danger that it may produce O’Hagan’s outcome.  
 
4.3 Cause of Action under Rule 10b-5 
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The cause of action for a petitioner in a securities fraud litigation brought under Rule 
10b-5 is an implied remedy, in which court is invited to exercise its inherent broad 
discretion with which it formulates the requirements of recovery.154 Materiality, 
reliance, causation and damages are the elements under the rule usually employed 
on the basis of traditional or market model of investment decision.155 The traditional 
model ensures that relevant information is equally available to everyone in the 
securities market, the idea being that ‘if disclosure of information is made sufficiently 
meaningful and accessible, investors will rely on it in making investment 
decisions.’156 Under market model, the issue of equal access to information or any 
access at all matters not than the question of whether the price of security was 
artificially high or low at the time of purchase or sale.  
 
4.3.1 Materiality 
A petitioner in securities fraud litigation under Rule 10b-5 is required to prove that the 
information allegedly wrongly withheld or falsely disseminated was material, and 
there must be substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider 
the information important in making investment decision157 and the court in Escott v. 
Barchris Construction Co158 appreciated the difficulty of the test under traditional 
model, stating that ‘since no one knows what moves or does not move the mythical 
"average prudent investor," it comes down to a question of judgment, to be exercised 
by the trier of the fact as best he can in the light of all the circumstances.’159 It is not 
likely the case that the judicial discretion is amenable under market model as its 
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focus is on what actually caused the security to trade at artificially high or low prices, 
so that materiality is not determined arbitrarily.160  
 
4.3.2 Reliance 
In Basic Incorporated v Levinson,161 the Supreme Court noted that misleading 
information has the capacity to defraud investors of stock even if they do not directly 
rely on the misstatements162, stressing that ‘the causal connection between the 
defendant’s fraud and the plaintiff’s purchase of stock in such a case is no less 
significant than in a case of direct reliance on misrepresentations.’163 This is a fact 
based on market model under which it does not matter if the investor is unaware of 
the misleading information unlike the traditional model in which the investor must 
prove that he is well aware of the allegedly misleading information.164 Fischer 
explained that ‘the difficulty of proof rather than any conceptual difficulty with the 
requirement itself is what eliminates the need for proof of reliance in omissions 
cases.’165 He emphasised that ‘because the rational course for investors (under 
market model) is simply to accept (rely on) the market price, it is of no consequence 
whether a plaintiff can demonstrate that he relied upon a particular piece of 
information.’166 Coffee and Sale note that Supreme Court has recognised market 
theory has relieved the plaintiff the burden of having to prove individualised reliance 
on misstatement on the basis of presumption that he did rely and then it is for the 
defendant to rebut.167 
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4.3.3 Causation and Damages 
The important question in damages under market model is the same as in 
materiality, reliance, and causation relating to the fact of whether the alleged 
fraudulent conduct had any effect on the price of security. The effect is that the 
plaintiff is not compensated for losses caused by the forces of supply and 
demand.168 This is unlike the traditional model in which not only must the plaintiff 
prove materiality and reliance but also that the alleged conduct caused the economic 
loss and the amount lost, and it is an awful lot of trouble to establish proof.169   
 
4.3.4 Defence 
Exercise of due diligence is a defence available to corporate and constructive 
defendants if they can show that they have done all that is reasonable in the 
circumstances.170 For intentional fraud, there is no due diligence because it is 
illogical to have due diligence for an act that is intentionally fraudulent.171 Standard of 
what is reasonable is very high and that leaves a thin chance of success.172  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER V 
 
THE CASE OF MORRISON v NATIONAL AUSTRALIA BANK LTD 
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It is not in doubt that Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act has no explicit indication that 
it has extraterritorial application. The longstanding principle of American law is that 
unless a statute expressly provides for extraterritorial application, it has to be 
concluded that it has none. This has given rise to the presumption against 
extraterritoriality in which U.S. courts were required to construe Rule 10b-5 as having 
no application to fraudulent conduct associated with securities transaction outside 
the United States or transaction in securities not listed on any U.S. stock exchange. 
However, there seems to have been an age long tradition among Second Circuit 
Court of Appeals of having always to go down the line of thinking that Congress 
would have intended the antifraud legislation to apply extraterritorially. However, in 
Morrison v National Australia Bank Ltd, the U.S. Supreme Court decided to set aside 
the effects and conduct test replacing them with transaction test which restored the 
presumption against extraterritoriality.  
 
5.1 Facts of the Case 
The plaintiffs who were largely Australian residents alleged that National Australia 
Bank Limited (‘the Bank’) violated Rule 10b-5 on the basis of their purchases of the 
ordinary shares of the bank. The allegation concerned misstatements some of which 
were claimed to have originated from the United States regarding HomeSide – a 
failed U.S. mortgage business purchased by the bank in Florida. Certain of the 
bank’s instruments known as American Depository Receipts (ADR traded on the 
New York Stock Exchange but its ordinary shares were not. With the exception of 
Frank Cicuto who was then the chief executive officer of the bank, the rests of the 
defendants Hugh Harris, Kevin Race and W. Blake Wilson were HomeSide's chief 
executive officer, chief operating officer, and chief financial officer, respectively, 
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during the relevant period and are collectively referred to as (“Defendants”). From 
the turn of events, the bank announced on July 5, 2001 that it was writing down the 
value of HomeSide's assets by $ 450 million thereby resulting in over 5% drop in 
price of ordinary shares and ADR in their respective markets. Two months later 
(September 3) it announced another write down by the tune of $ 1.75 billion resulting 
in ordinary share price drop of 13% and ADR price drop of more than 11.5%.  
 
Robert Morrison is the American lead domestic plaintiff whose action became 
consolidated with those of the foreign plaintiffs as a class action. The plaintiffs 
claimed that the bank’s and HomeSide's officers, in their capacities as controlling 
persons, allegedly (1) knowingly used unrealistic financial models in order to 
artificially inflate its Mortgage Servicing Rights (“MSR”) values; (2) the defendants' 
various statements as to HomeSide's profitability and its contribution to the bank’s 
profitability were consequently false and intentionally misleading; and (3) the alleged 
fraud, when revealed, caused losses for the owners of the bank’s securities.173  
 
5.2 Opinion of the U. S. District Court for the Southern District of New York 
While the lead foreign plaintiffs based their contention on the basis of their status as 
investors who purchased the bank’s securities at the relevant time, the lead domestic 
plaintiff purports to represent a class of investors who purchased the bank’s ADR 
during the relevant time. To this effect, the defendants challenged the subject matter 
jurisdiction of the lead foreign plaintiffs under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure (“FRC Procedure”) on the basis that ‘the transactions of which these 
plaintiffs complain is fundamentally foreign in nature, and thus beyond the scope of 
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this Court's jurisdiction under the Exchange Act.’174 The defendants did not challenge 
the lead domestic plaintiff on similar ground apparently because theirs is well 
covered under the Exchange Act; rather they based their contention for failure to 
state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) of the FRC Procedure.      
 
Much as the Court felt a sense of overriding principle from the Second Circuit’s 
proposition on the subject matter jurisdiction as one grounded on Congressional 
policy bound by a standard of reasonableness, it took the view that the presumption 
in such a case was against extraterritoriality. Therefore, the appropriate cause of 
action for the Court was to rely on the ‘effect test’ and ‘conduct test’ propounded by 
Second Circuit in Leasco and Schoenbaum and it believed that a combination of the 
two gives a better picture as to justification for the extraterritorial application of the 
Exchange Act. The Court however was of the view that in a class action such as this 
‘where the effects of an alleged fraud are predominantly foreign, the amount of 
domestic conduct and its nexus to the alleged injury required to sustain jurisdiction is 
at its greatest.’175 Putting everything together, Judge Barbara S. Jones, District 
Judge who presided over the case, ruled that the action of the lead foreign plaintiffs 
did not meet the requirements of both effect and conduct tests and so are unable to 
discharge the burden of proving the existence of subject matter jurisdiction.  
 
The Court saw the case as falling between Bersch relied upon by defendants to 
argue that the securities at issue were predominantly foreign securities traded on 
foreign exchanges, and SEC v. Berger176 relied upon by foreign lead plaintiffs in 
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which it is ascertainable that the fraudulent conduct was carried out entirely in the 
United States. The Court found an ice breaker in Froese v Staff177 for similarity of 
facts in the sense that the corporate defendant was alleged to have (as in this case) 
prepared and disseminated from Germany an artificially inflated earning statements 
upon which the plaintiffs incurred losses. Judge Owen declined jurisdiction because 
the alleged fraudulent statements were conceived, engineered and published in 
Germany even though it emanated from the United States. In In re Bayer AG 
Secur.Litigation178, the defendant is a German company which sold its securities 
primarily in foreign markets and, to a lesser extent, in the form of ADRs in the United 
States. The plaintiffs’ case was that they relied on the fraudulent profit projection 
issued about the defendant’s U.S. subsidiary as a result of which they suffered 
losses. Judge Pauley declined jurisdiction based on the fact that the dissemination of 
the alleged false statements embodying the heart of the alleged fraud took place in 
Germany. It follows then that the District Court in this case the plaintiffs fell short of 
discharging the burden of demonstrating that Congress intended to extend the reach 
of its laws to the predominantly foreign securities transactions at issue here.179     
 
In relations to the claim under Rule 12(b) (6) of the FRC Procedure, upon which the 
lead domestic plaintiff – Robert Morrison contended that he and other investors 
purchased the bank’s ADR securities traded on the NYSE at the relevant time, the 
Court agreed with the defendants that there was a clear lack of standing as the 
plaintiff failed to state a claim of any damage he suffered as a consequence of the 
alleged fraudulent financial statements. Whereas Mr. Morrison stated that he 
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purchased 125 ADRs at $74 per security on August 11 2000, the mean trading price 
during the statutory look-back period was $75, which indeed was one dollar more 
than what he bought the securities. Mr Morrison needs to have suffered pecuniary 
loss in accordance with Commercial Union Assur. Co. v. Milken180 and as a private 
securities fraud action, his claim was bound by the Private Securities Litigation 
Reform Act of 1995 and so his recovery was ‘limited to the amount by which his 
purchase price exceeds the security’s mean price during the 90-day period 
immediately following correcting disclosure (look-back period).’181 Having fallen short 
of this statutory requirement, the Court dismissed the complaint accordingly but 
granted the plaintiffs' counsel leave to substitute a lead domestic plaintiff and to 
otherwise amend the pleadings with respect to ADR purchasers only.  
 
5.3 Opinion of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals 
The lead foreign plaintiffs who became appellants appealed against the District 
Court’s decision dismissing their complaint. Robert Morrison, the lead domestic 
plaintiff whose case was also dismissed did not appeal but he remained inexplicably 
listed as a petitioner in this appeal and subsequently. In a unanimous opinion 
delivered by Judge Parker on behalf of Judges Newman and Calabresi, the Second 
Circuit dismissed the appeal for a mix of factors including the fact that the alleged 
fraud was predominantly foreign having originated from the bank’s corporate 
headquarters in Australia, the complete lack of effect on America or Americans, and 
the lengthy chain of causation between HomeSide’s actions and the statements that 
reached the investors.182  
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In relations to the first factor of the case being predominantly foreign in nature the 
Circuit was quick to note the characterisation of the case as ‘foreign-cubed’ not just 
that it was the first kind of securities class action to reach the Circuit but also how it 
touched upon the issue of subject matter jurisdiction in a novelty seen by Judge 
Jones as ‘a set of (1) foreign plaintiffs suing (2) a foreign issuer in an American court 
for violations of American securities laws based on securities transactions in (3) 
foreign countries.’183 However, the Circuit did not think the novelty was good enough 
to change what has remained their position to the effect that subject matter 
jurisdiction could exist only "if the defendant's conduct in the United States was more 
than merely preparatory to the fraud, and particular acts or culpable failures to act 
within the United States directly caused losses to foreign investors abroad."184 Of 
course the Circuit felt bound by their own decision in Bersch and Vencap as the 
current standard of determining the subject matter jurisdiction from the perspective of 
conduct test under which it is possible to identify which action or actions constituted 
the fraud that directly caused harm. In the case of Bersch it would amount to the ‘act 
of placing the allegedly false and misleading prospectus in the hands of 
purchasers’185 and in the case of Vencap, it would amount to determining ‘if that act 
or those actions emanated from the United States.’186  
 
Curiously, the Circuit’s decision in Berger does not appear to be consistent with the 
proposition that the alleged fraudulent information if emanated from abroad may 
deprive the court asserting subject matter jurisdiction. In that case, the statement 
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that ultimately conveyed the fraudulent information to investors were mailed from 
Bermuda but the Circuit asserted subject matter jurisdiction under conduct test on 
the ground that the ‘fraudulent scheme was masterminded and implemented by 
Berger in the United States.’187 According to them, ‘the critical factor was that the 
conduct that directly caused loss to investors -- the creation of the fraudulent 
statements -- occurred in New York.’188 That was the same argument of the 
appellants that Florida constituted the place of the improper conduct because the 
information disseminated by the bank consisted solely of the mechanical insertion of 
HomeSide’s numbers into the statement and public filings and therefore consistent 
with the proposition in Berger, it would amount to conduct in the United States and 
not Australia. Yet, the Circuit insisted that ‘the actions taken and the actions not 
taken by the bank in Australia were, in our view, significantly more central to the 
fraud and more directly responsible for the harm to investors than the manipulation 
of the numbers in Florida.’189  
 
As far as it goes the proposition in Berger provides the Circuit with a ground to reject 
the defendants’ advice for the court to replace conduct and effects tests in foreign-
cubed cases with bright-line location because of the former’s potential conflict 
between U.S. antifraud laws and those of other countries. The Circuit’s attitude is 
that instead of conflict, there is a widespread consensus that ‘anti-fraud enforcement 
objectives are broadly similar as governments and other regulators are generally in 
agreement that fraud should be discouraged.’190 Therefore, the Circuit declined to 
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place any limits beyond the conduct test on foreign-cubed securities fraud cases 
because of its potential to balance competing concerns.      
 
On the issue of complete lack of effect of the alleged fraudulent conduct on America 
or Americans, the appellants did not pursue their claim on the basis of effect test as 
their interest was solely on behalf of those who purchased the bank’s securities on 
foreign exchanges. So, there was no contention about the fact that the alleged fraud 
had no any meaningful effect on America’s investors or its securities market.  
 
The lengthy chain of events as a factor is the idea that the appellants need to 
establish a causal link between the part America played in the misstatements and 
the harm on the investors. The appellant failed to show that HomeSide sent falsified 
numbers directly to investors. The Circuit’s view is that as much as ‘HomeSide may 
have been the original source of the problematic numbers, those numbers had to 
pass through a number of checkpoints manned by the bank's Australian personnel 
before reaching investors.’191 It was necessary for the Circuit to get rid of those 
checkpoints or lengthy chain of events in order to establish a direct link between the 
misstatements and the losses suffered by the investors.  
 
It is remarkable that beyond these three factors, the Circuit did recognize the long 
standing proposition about the silence of the Securities Exchange Act as to its 
extraterritorial application, something which leaves them with a chance to turn to the 
underlying purpose of the antifraud provisions as a guide to determining if Congress 
would have wished to devote the precious resources of the United States Courts and 
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law enforcement agencies to securities law claim with an international element. 
Noting that ‘the underlying purpose of Section 10(b) is to remedy deceptive and 
manipulative conduct with the potential to harm the public interest or the interests of 
investors’192, the Court suggested that ‘it is consistent with the statutory scheme to 
infer that Congress would have wanted to redress harms perpetrated abroad which 
have a substantial impact on investors or markets within the United States.’193 
Whether this would augur well with the long standing presumption against 
extraterritoriality is yet a different matter and it is pertinent that it was a dividing line 
at the Supreme Court.   
 
5.3 Opinion of the United States Supreme Court 
The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal but faulted the reasoning through which 
the Second Circuit arrived at their conclusion. Firstly, they held Second Circuit were 
wrong to have allowed dismissal of the case under Rule 12(b)(1) in their 
consideration of the extraterritoriality of Section 10(b) raising a question of subject 
matter jurisdiction. The Supreme Court considered conduct reach of Section 10(b) as 
a merits question and the subject-matter jurisdiction as the power of a tribunal to 
hear a case, and so it was their view that the District Court clearly had jurisdiction 
under 15 U.S.C. Section 78aa to adjudicate on Section 10(b) question. The matter 
nonetheless would have been dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) and so the Supreme 
Court thought it unnecessary to remit the case.  
 
The main issue is the proposition that ‘Section 10(b) does not provide a cause of 
action to foreign plaintiffs suing foreign and American defendants for misconduct in 
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connection with securities traded on foreign exchanges.’194 Both the Second Circuit 
and District Court were in agreement with this proposition but the Supreme Court 
amplified it in three ways. The first is a longstanding principle enunciated in EEOC v. 
Arabian American Oil Co (Aramco)195 that ‘unless there is the affirmative intention of 
the Congress clearly expressed’ to give a statute extraterritorial effect, the courts 
must presume that it is primarily concerned with domestic conditions.196 The second 
is the fact that the jurisdiction of Rule 10b-5 is subsumed in Section 10(b) so that if 
section 10(b) is not extraterritorial it logically follows that Rule 10b-5 is not. Thirdly, 
although the petitioners might have claimed Florida as the place where HomeSide 
and its executives engaged in the alleged deceptive conduct and where some 
misleading statements were made, it does not follow that they (petitioners) only seek 
domestic application of the Act. As they noted, this particular case is very rare in the 
sense of prohibited extraterritorial application lacking in all contacts with the United 
States, the focus of the Exchange Act, they explained, is not on the place where the 
deception originated, but on the purchases and sales of securities in the United 
States. To that effect, the remit of Section 10(b) is transactions in securities listed on 
exchanges in the United States and domestic transactions in other securities.  
 
The critical point in this case was the reinstatement of the presumption against 
extraterritoriality by the Supreme Court, which did not like the fact that the Second 
Circuit formed the habit over the years of disregarding the principle in determining 
the Exchange Act particularly Section 10(b) to fraudulent schemes that involve 
conduct and effects abroad. The Exchange Act does not indicate whether or not 
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Section 10(b) has extraterritorial application, and so the Second Circuit thought that 
it was right for the court to ‘discern’ whether Congress would have wanted the 
Statute to apply. This came to the Supreme Court as a definitive way of exercising 
presumption against extraterritoriality from the jurisprudence of Section 10(b) in 
favour of what it described as inquiry whether it would be reasonable, on the basis of 
what Congress would have wanted, to apply the statute to a given situation. The 
majority of the panel did not think it was right for the court to pick and choose, and so 
Justice Antonin Scalia who delivered the lead opinion noted that not only that the 
Second Circuit did not put forward textual or extratextual basis for its action but also 
ignored its own confession in Bersch that ‘if we were asked to point to language in 
the statutes, or even in the legislative history, that compelled these conclusions, we 
would be unable to respond.’197 The majority thought that rather than courts ‘divining’ 
what Congress would have wished if it had addressed the problem, a more natural 
inquiry might be what jurisdiction Congress in fact thought about and conferred. In 
effect, the Supreme Court is saying that instead of guest work in just about every 
other case, it is better to apply the presumption in all cases in order to preserve ‘a 
stable background against which Congress can legislate with predictable effects.’198 
On that basis, the Supreme Court held that there was no affirmative indication in the 
Exchange Act that Section 10(b) applied extraterritorially, and therefore concluded 
that it did not.   
 
It is interesting to note that every member of the 8-man panel did agree with the 
general conclusion but there was some kind of dissention or minority opinion as to 
                                                          
197 519 F.2d at 993 
198 No.1 at 25 
 
DISSERTATION S3012 
 
49 
 
the nature of the emphasis the Court has given to the issue at stake. Justice John 
Paul Stevens with whom Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg concurred took exception to 
the new transactional test on the basis that the issue should have been how much 
and what kinds of domestic contacts would be sufficient to trigger off Section 10(b), 
and that rather than setting aside conduct and effects test, it should have been made 
the standard of determining extraterritorial application of Section 10(b).199 Justice 
Beyer regretted the fact that the case did not require the Court to consider other 
circumstances beyond the narrow margins upon which the general conclusion was 
reached.   
       
5.4 Issues Arising from the Case 
Transactional test has replaced the age-long conduct and effects test as a way of 
determining the statutory limit of Section 10(b) in terms of extraterritorial application. 
It means that Rule 10b-5 applies to only securities listed on a United States 
exchange and not on a foreign exchange. It means there is no longer any cause of 
action on the basis of Rule 10b-5 so long as the plaintiff is a foreigner suing foreign 
and American defendants in the U.S. for deceptive conduct associated with 
securities traded on a foreign exchange. This development entails a number of 
implications worth examining below. 
 
5.4.1 Establishing When a Transaction Takes Place in the United States 
The solicitude of transactional test in the context of Section 10(b) is the ‘purchase or 
sale’ of any security in so far as they are registered on a U.S. domestic securities 
exchange or those not so registered. However, when considering what constitutes 
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transaction, it is not clear whether where the money originated in a purchase of 
securities or to whom it went in a sale of securities determinative.200 Farris suggests 
that it is for the lower courts to determine when a purchase or sale has taken place in 
the United States regarding non-U.S. listed securities but then wonders whether it is 
possible for an underwriter doing a U.S. road show with extensive U.S. directed 
selling effort, but closing all sales of securities abroad avoid Rule 10b-5.201 The 
deduction from Justice Scalia's opinion is that Rule 10b-5 would not apply to any 
transactions on foreign exchanges irrespective of the fact that the securities are also 
listed on a US exchange. That being the case the lower courts may proceed on that 
proposition but it is not easy to draw the line.   
 
5.4.2 Beneficiaries of Rule 10b-5 in Relations to Purchase or Sale Orders with 
Brokers from the United States on Non US Exchanges 
 
The Supreme Court’s proposition is that ‘Section 10(b) reaches the use of a 
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance only in connection with the purchase 
or sale of a security listed on an American stock exchange, and the purchase or sale 
of any other security in the United States.’202 It is not clear if statutory beneficiaries 
were intended to be citizens of the United States. It can therefore be said that under 
Rule 10b-5 U.S. residents purchasing securities abroad will not be protected. Even 
Justice Steven’s concurring opinion alluded to the fact that an American investor who 
buys shares abroad in a company listed only on a non-U.S. exchange has no cause 
of action under Rule 10b-5. In the absence of statutory clarity, it is right to agree with 
Sachs on the need to construe the Act to cover all U.S. domestic investors whether 
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or not they are United States citizens203 ‘since distinguishing among domestic 
traders on the basis of alienage would violate principles of equal protection.’204 
 
5.4.3 Enforcement actions of SEC and the Department of Justice to the new 
extraterritoriality test 
 
What the Supreme Court has done is to disapprove of private cause of action 
available under Section 10(b) against persons or corporate organisations found to 
have violated conduct prohibited by Rule 10b-5. It follows then that claims in 
relations to Rule 10b-5 may not be made on the basis of purchase or sale of 
securities on foreign exchanges or securities transactions outside the United States. 
However, the decision does not seem, as it were, to have extinguished the power of 
SEC to initiate enforcement proceedings in such a foreign-cubed case as Morrison. It 
is understood from the concurring opinion of Justice Stevens and Justice Ginsburg 
that ‘the Court’s opinion does not . . . foreclose the SEC from bringing enforcement 
actions in additional circumstances, as no issue concerning the SEC’s authority is 
presented by this case.’205 They believe that not only that the ‘SEC’s enforcement 
proceedings differ from private Section 10(b) actions in numerous potentially relevant 
respects’206, but also ‘they pose a lesser threat to international comity.’207  
 
Moreover, things appear likely to take a new shape under what looks like legislative 
ambush to Morrison. The Investment Protection and Securities Reform Bill of 2010 
pending at the Congress seeks to strengthen SEC enforcement power as well as 
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reinstate right of private action.208 When it is signed into law, the effect of the 
legislation is that U.S. courts will have jurisdiction over violations of Securities Act of 
1933, the Investment Advisors Act of 1940, and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
concerning either one of the two sets of conducts.209 The first is ‘conduct within the 
United States that constitutes significant steps in furtherance of the violation, even if 
the securities transaction occurs outside the United States and involves only foreign 
investors.’210 The alternative conduct is that ‘occurring outside the United States that 
has a foreseeable substantial effect within the United States.’211 Hans and Gill note 
that SEC would be required to report upon careful study, the extent to which private 
rights of action under the Exchange Act should be extended to cover the above two 
sets of conducts.212 What the development suggests is that the current denial of 
private right of action and the conduct and effects test are only temporarily on hold 
while transactional test and Morrison are just living on borrowed times.     
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CONCLUSION 
 
Morrison reaffirmed a critical point in international law that securities regulation is a 
matter for territorial jurisdiction. The Supreme Court did not think that regulation of 
foreign exchange was within the remit of the Exchange Act and Congress power to 
do so could never have been rationalised under international law.213 Although, Sachs 
would argue that Congress do indeed have discretion if they so wish to decide 
whether and to what extent statutes could apply beyond the United States and there 
is even an issue that if constitution and international law could stand on the way, 
their constraints are clearly minimal.214 However, in practical terms it is not the case 
that the Exchange Act or indeed many U.S. statutes are affirmatively indicative of 
extraterritoriality and Morrison clearly confirms that the legislative solicitude of the 
Congress is domestic conditions.215     
 
There are broader conflict of laws issues that arise from the decision upon which 
extraterritoriality can be limited other than the instrumentality of transactional test. 
The doctrine of comity, invocation of forum non conveniens, and the propriety of 
certification can all avail the courts of immense opportunity to restrict the application 
of Rule 10b-5 remedy particularly in a class-action context.216 The doctrine of comity 
is the idea that extraterritoriality ‘creates the potential for particularly 
severe conflict with other countries on the question of how best to regulate global 
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economic activity.’217 Courts will therefore be disposed on one hand to the question  
regarding recognition of their judgment abroad such that defendant will not be 
subjected to multiplicity of suits, and on the other hand to the question of availability 
of alternative remedies in the defendant’s home country and any prospect of conflict 
of such remedies with an exercise of U.S. jurisdiction.218 These two questions 
provide foreign plaintiffs with opportunity to seek dismissal of securities action on 
forum non conveniens and Choi and Silberman found that courts have applied that 
principle in transnational securities actions where the alternative forum is a foreign 
forum and unlikely to apply U.S. securities laws.219 Similar questions are raised in 
proprietary of certification in international securities class-action suits, and courts 
must determine ‘whether a class of foreign investors is “superior to other available 
methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy” pursuant to Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3).’220  
 
There are implications of this decision for the international securities market. The 
hands of foreign issuers and underwriters are no longer tied by the apron strings of 
U.S. securities law so long as they sell their non U.S.-listed securities to U.S. 
institutions and investors in an offshore transaction through a non U.S. affiliate.221 
This action would never have been possible under conduct and effects regime 
without the risk of Rule 10b-5 if fraudulent conduct is alleged to have taken place in 
the course of the transaction. It is also possible now to structure securities sale to 
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take place abroad through contractual means unlike when liabilities under Rule 10b-
5 were applicable regardless of intentions of parties and could not be claimed on the 
basis of contract.222 It does mean that issuers including private issuers are 
incentivised to list their securities in non U.S. exchanges but it also may become a 
disincentive to U.S. institutional investors.223      
 
It is important to note that the merit of extraterritorial application of national securities 
regulation is not at issue. There are indeed ascertainable collateral benefits 
associated with extraterritorial application of antifraud rules in the context of 
international fraudulent activities. Extraterritoriality provides as much deterrence as it 
encourages other nations to tighten their noose against securities fraud in their own 
jurisdictions because it is of no credit to any foreign nation that its nationals have the 
ability to engage in fraudulent transactions.13224 However, the contention has been 
the statutory basis upon which U.S. courts seise themselves of the power to apply 
the United States national securities regulation to fraudulent activities that have 
taken place outside the United States. Morrison found the approach to be 
inconsistent with presumption against extraterritoriality, and it can neither be 
rationalised under territorial jurisdictional principle of international law nor justified 
under the conflict of law rules of private international law. There is no gainsaying the 
fact that it also has potential for ‘redundant and unnecessarily costly systems of 
overlapping regulations.’  
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It is sensible to heed calls for international harmonisation of securities regulation and 
enforcement in ways that encourage negotiation and compromise among countries 
so that all interests will be taken on board. However, the viability of such approach is 
doubtful on the basis of inadequacies of public international law to deal with 
multidimensional problems associated with the contemporary international economic 
relations. There is no doubt that Morrison will prove to maintain and preserve the 
balance of territorial jurisdiction in the application of U.S. national securities 
regulation even if only for a while. However, the status quo is likely to be restored 
when the Investment Protection and Securities Reform Bill of 2010 pending at the 
Congress is enacted. With that in place, extraterritoriality will stage a come-back and 
it will all be business as usual. Until then, the principle of territorial jurisdiction 
suffices in the context of the presumption against extraterritorial application of the 
United States national securities regulation.           
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DISSERTATION S3012 
 
57 
 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
Adams, David, Banking and Capital Markets, Guildford: College of Law Publishing, 
2008 
 
Bagheri, Mahmood, International Contract and National Economic Regulation: 
Dispute Resolution through International Commercial Arbitration, London: Kluwer 
Law International, 2000 
 
Benjamin, Joanna, Interests in Securities: A Proprietary Law Analysis of International 
Securities Market, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000 
 
Buxbuam, Hannah L., ‘Multinational Class Actions under Federal Securities Law: 
Managing Jurisdictional Conflict’, Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, Vol. 46, 
Issue 1, Indiana Legal Studies Research Paper No.33 
 
Chang, Kun Young ‘Multinational Enforcement of U.S. Securities Laws: The Need for 
Clear and Restrained Scope of Extraterritorial Subject-Matter Jurisdiction’, Fordham 
Journal of Corporate and Financial Law, Vol. 9, Issue 1, Article 2, 2003 
 
Choi, Stephen J. and Silberman, Linda J. ‘Transnational Litigation and Global 
Securities Class-Action Lawsuits’, Wisconsin Law Review, April 7 2009 
 
Clarke, Wayne, (ed.) Fisher and Lightwood’s Law of Mortgage London: LexisNexis 
Butterworth, 2006 
 
Coffee Jr, John C. and Sale, Hilary A., Securities Regulation: Cases and Materials, 
New York: Foundation Press, 2009 
 
‘Extraterritorial Jurisdiction’, Canada Law Reform Commission Working Paper No.37, 
1984-85 
 
Fawcett, J.J. and Carruthers, J.M. Cheshire, North and Fawcett’s Private 
International Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008 
 
Friedman, George, ‘States, ‘Economics and Markets: Redefining the Rules’, Stratfor 
Global Intelligence, October 13 2008 
 
Fuller, Geoffrey, The Law and Practice of International Capital Market, London: 
LexisNexis Butterworth, 2007 
 
Haseltine, William B. ‘International Regulation of Securities Market: Interaction 
Between United States and Foreign Laws’, International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly, 1987 
 
International Organisation of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), ‘Objectives and 
Principles of Securities Regulation’ 
 
James, Laylin K. ‘Securities Act of 1933’, Michigan Law Review, Vol.32, 1933-1934 
DISSERTATION S3012 
 
58 
 
 
Jennings, Richard W. and Marsh, Harold Jr, Securities Regulation: Cases and 
Materials, New York: Foundation Press, 1987, 
 
Johnston, David and Rockwell, Kathleen Doyle, Canadian Securities Regulation, 
London: LexisNexis Butterworth, 2006 
 
Kokkoris, Ioannis and Olavares-Caminal, Rodrigo, ‘Some Issues on Cross-Border 
Stock Exchange Merger’, University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law, 
Vol.29.2, 2007-2008 
 
Lange, Dieter and Born, Gary, (ed) Extraterritorial Application of National Laws 
(International Chamber of Commerce) London: Kluwer Law and Taxation, 1987 
 
Libin, Nancy C. and Wrona, James S. ‘The Securities Industry and the Internet: A 
Suitable Match?, Columbia Business Law Review, Vol. 2001 
 
Loss, Louise and Seligman, Joel Fundamentals of Securities Regulation, New York: 
ASPEN, 2004 
 
Meessen, Karl M. (ed.), Extraterritorial Jurisdiction in Theory and Practice, London: 
Kluwer Law International, 1996 
 
Ogus, Anthony I., Regulation: Legal Form and Economic Theory, Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 2004 
 
Prosser, Tony ‘Public Service Law: Privatisation’s Unexpected Offering’, in Colin 
Scott, Regulation, Burlington: (Dartmouth/Ashgate Publishing Company, 2003 
 
Sachs, Margaret V. ‘The International Reach of Rule 10b-5: The Myth of 
Congressional Silence’, Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, January 1 1990 
 
Scheznick, P., ‘Focusing Organisational Research on Regulation’ in R. Noll (ed.), 
Regulatory Policy and the Social Sciences, American Enterprise Institute for public 
policy research, 1983 
 
Thomas, Barbara S., ‘Extraterritoriality in an Era of the Internationalisation of 
Securities Market: The Need to visit Domestic Policies’, Rutgers Law Review, Vol.35 
No.3, 1983 
 
Vodicka, Mark, International Securities Trading, Redfern: Legal Books, 1992 
 
 
